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Since this survey' is a continuation of previous articles,2 the same
policies of selection will be used, and developments in various areas will
be presented as an integrated continuum.
I. RIGHT To COUNSEL
Perhaps the most interesting development of the period surveyed
was the change in the law governing an indigent defendant's right to
counsel. Previously the Supreme Court of Florida had expressed appre-
hension of such changes as instances of federal intervention into state
sovereignty. For example in Cash v. Culver,' after granting a new trial
because the defendant's request for a continuance in order to obtain new
counsel was denied, the court stated,
In recent years much has been written regarding federal post-
conviction review of state court judgments in criminal matters.
We think there is substance to the notion that there has been a
broadening of Fourteenth Amendment due process restrictions
on state action. However, we have the view that a contributing
factor in this development has been the apparent reluctance of
some state courts to take cognizance of and apply many of these
basic concepts of due process which are of relatively recent
origin but are nonetheless controlling law. In following such a
course we think the State Jurisdictions merely invite inroads on
their sovereignty. See "Federalism and State Criminal Pro-
cedure," Volume 70, Harvard Law Review 1, a splendid article
by Justice Walter Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois.
We have no desire to contribute further to this development.
The previous prevailing law in Florida with respect to indigent
defendants gave an "absolute" right to counsel only in capital cases.4
In non-capital cases any duty to furnish an indigent defendant counsel
was contingent upon a finding that the defendant was incapable of
defending himself adequately under the special circumstances of the
particular case.' The manner in which the Florida courts have applied
this policy in recent cases is illustrated by the following examples. An
inexperienced, emotionally unstable indigent defendant was convicted
1. This survey includes cases reported in 132 So.2d through 155 So.2d 536 and laws
enacted by the 1963 General Session of the Florida Legislature.
2. Wills, Criminal Law Survey, 16 U. MIAmi L. Rav. 225 (1961); Criminal Law Survey,
14 U. MIaI L. REV. 521 (1960).
3. 122 So.2d 179, 186 (Fla. 1960).
4. FLA. STAT. § 909.21 (1961).
5. Johnson v. Mayo, 40 So.2d 134 (Fla. 1949); Schafer, Constitutional Law:
Duty of Trial Court to Appoint Defense Counsel in Non-Capital Case, 1 U. FLA. L. Rav. 450
(1948).
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of assault with intent to commit murder in the second degree. He had
no counsel and had requested none for he was unaware of any right to
do so. The court' remanded the case for a new trial with specific instruc-
tions that the defendant be advised of his rights.' On the other hand,
when there was no particular evidence of inexperience or instability
(other than the fact that the defendant was charged with the possession
of a narcotic drug) failure to inquire of an indigent defendant as to
such matters as his age, experience and mental capacity, and failure to
appoint counsel were not reversible error.8
Gideon v. Wainwright, broadened the rights of indigent defendants
in non-capital cases and in so doing posed policy questions of special
interest. These aspects of the case are more appropriately discussed in
the Survey of constitutional law. Here the account will be descriptive
only.
Gideon was charged with a felony-breaking and entering with
the intent to commit a misdemeanor. He appeared without funds and
requested counsel. His request was denied and he was convicted and
sentenced to serve five years in the state prison. After his petition to the
Supreme Court of Florida for a writ of habeas corpus was denied without
opinion,"° he brought certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States." The Supreme Court held that the right to counsel guaranteed
by the sixth amendment, which is fundamental and essential to a fair
trial, is made obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth amendment.'
2
Therefore, the Court reversed the conviction and remanded to the
Supreme Court of Florida for further action not inconsistent with the
opinion.
One obvious question concerns the limits of the decision with
respect to types of offenses. In the body of a concurring opinion Mr.
Justice Harlan stated,
The special circumstance rule has been formally abandoned in
capital cases, and the time has come when it should be similarly
abandoned in non capital cases, at least to offenses which, as the
one involved here, carry the possibility of substantial prison
6. McNeal v. Culver, 132 So.2d 151 (Fla. 1961).
7. See also Hobbs v. Cochran, 143 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1962); Carnley v. Cochran, 143 So.2d
327 (Fla. 1962).
8. Horoshko v. State, 135 So.2d 865 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
9. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
10. Gideon v. Cochran, 135 So.2d 746 (Fla. 1961).
11. See note 9 supra.
12. The court emphasized that in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942),. it was assumed
that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is fundamental and essential to a fair trial is
made obligatory by the fourteenth amendment, but decided under facts similar to the
Gideon case that the right to counsel provided by the sixth amendment was not one of
those rights.
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sentence. 18 (Whether the rule should extend to all criminal cases
need not now be decided.)' 4
Another provocative set of questions concerns the limits of the
decision with respect to pre-trial"5 and post-trial procedures. Decisions
of the Supreme Court indicate that an indigent defendant should be
supplied counsel at the arraignment 16 and the preliminary hearing. 7
The Florida courts have had occasion to consider the duty of the state
to furnish counsel in post-trial procedure in light of the Gideon decision.
An indigent prisoner who had been convicted of a non-capital felony
petitioned the district court of appeal to appoint counsel to assist him
in his appeal. The case arose in Pinellas County, where a public defender
had been established by an act' s which provided for appeal "when in
the opinion of the Public Defender the appeal or writ might reasonably
be expected to result in reversal or modification." The district court 9
avoided the problems implied by the discretion given the public defender
by directing the trial court to appoint counsel. In another case 20 an in-
digent defendant appealed an order denying his motion under Criminal
Procedure Rule No. 121 to vacate judgment, and requested counsel to
13. Gideon was sentenced to five years in the state prison. The charge, breaking and
entering with the intent to commit a misdemeanor, arose under FLA. STAT. § 810.05 (1961),
which provides for imprisonment in the state prison or county jail not exceeding five years
or fine not exceeding five hundred dollars.
14. 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963); see also Kamesar, Where to Draw the Line, 22 THE LEOAL.
Am B.iEF CASE 10 (1963).
15. Comment, The Right to Counsel Prior to Trial in State Criminal Procedure, 17 U.
MiAmI L. Rxv. 371 (1963).
16. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
17. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
18. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-2663.
19. Donald v. State, 154 So.2d 357 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
20. Weeks v. State, 156 So.2d 36 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). Since this case was particularly
pertinent, it was included even though it appeared after the period to be surveyed.
21. FLA. R. CRmr. P. 1, effective April 1, 1963:
A prisoner in custody under Sentence of a court established by the Laws of Florida
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed
in violation of the Constitution or Laws of the United States, or of the State of
Florida, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or
that the sentence was in excess of the Maximum authorized by law, or is otherwisq
subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that
the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served
upon the prosecuting attorney of the court, grant a prompt hearing thereon, deter-
mine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect
thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or
that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to col-
lateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the consti-
tutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral
attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the
prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may
appear appropriate.
A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the pro-
duction of the prisoner at the hearing.
The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive
motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
1963]
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assist him in his appeal. The state argued that the right of an indigent
defendant to be supplied counsel for appellate purposes was limited
to direct appeals from original judgments of conviction and sentence.
The court rejected this view and held that:
Since it has been decided that a failure to provide counsel for
an indigent on direct review of his conviction is a violation of
his constitutional rights, we think it reasonable to conclude
that it would be no less of a violation of those rights to deny
him counsel on appellate review of collateral proceedings
attacking his conviction on constitutional grounds. 2
The Supreme Court of Florida anticipated an avalanche of petitions
for writs of habeas corpus and coram nobis. In order to expedite con-
sideration of these cases the court adopted Criminal Procedure Rule No.
1, which gives jurisdiction to the original trial courts."3
The first application of the rule by the Supreme Court of Florida
in response to an order from the Supreme Court of the United States
was in Roy v. Wainwright.24 The indigent defendant had been convicted
of a non-capital felony and petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that he had been denied counsel. The court set the pattern for
the application of the rule by denying the petition without prejudice
to proceed under Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1. The court took pains
to help the bench and bar understand the process. It noted that the
rule was copied almost verbatim from a federal statute25 and recom-
mended several sources2" of information concerning the construction
and application of the rule.
An appeal may be taken to the appropriate appellate court from the order
entered on the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas
corpus.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this rule, shall not be enter-
tained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to
the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it
also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention.
This rule shall not apply to municipal courts.
The foregoing rule shall become effective upon the filing of this order.
The Court acted under the rule making power granted by FLA. CoNST. art. V, § 3. The
bench has been concerned with practical means of handling the large number of cases
anticipated. The legislature has provided for public defenders in each judicial circuit to
represent insolvent persons charged with non-capital felonies. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-409.
22. 156 So.2d 36, 38 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
23. See note 21 supra.
24. 151 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1963). In Wittcop v. Wainwright, 151 So.2d 635 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1963), the same rule was applied but the opinion did not contain as detailed an explanation
and discussion as did the Roy case.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
26. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1951); FED. R. CRI. P. 35; 4 BARR oN &
HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2306; Bowman, Processing a Motion Attack-
ing Sentence Under Section 2255 of the Judicial Code, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 788 (1963). See
also Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S.




Subsequently, Gideon petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida
for a writ of habeas corpus.27 The court refused the writ without prejudice
to proceed under Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1. The court re-emphasized
many of the points made in the Roy28 case and added:
Under the rule which we have announced, post-conviction relief
can be obtained when there is a claimed denial of some funda-
mental or organic right in the course of the trial. The relief
available is coextensive with that which would be available in
habeas corpus. The rule, however minimizes the difficulties
encountered in habeas corpus hearings and affords the same
rights in a more convenient forum and one best prepared to
consider the claims of a prisoner convicted in that very forum.29
The problem of bail arose under Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1
when a prisoner moved to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence. Upon
denial the prisoner appealed and made a motion for supersedeas, which
he intended to operate as bail while his appeal was in process. When
this was denied he filed a motion in the district court for release on bail.
The motion was denied"° on the basis of federal authority."1
The Attorney General has advised3 2 that when a sentence has been
vacated under the rule, the person is not necessarily entitled to discharge,
but may be held for a new trial, and if convicted he may be subject to
the maximum sentence even though it exceeds the original sentence.
II. SENTENCE
Some recent Florida decisions seem to approve a more flexible ap-
proach to sentencing than previously had been apparent. For example,
even though an appellate court ordinarily will not be inclined to modify
or reduce sentences, a case involving contempt was remanded for re-
sentencing with instructions that the new sentence should not exceed
six months in the county jail.38 The court emphasized that appellate
courts must balance the need to preserve the integrity of the lower courts
with the need to temper justice with mercy.
In another instance the appellate court held that the refusal of the
trial judge to give the defendant an opportunity to present evidence of
mitigating circumstances before sentencing was contrary to section 921.13
of the Florida Statutes and remanded the case for that purpose.
4
27. Gideon v. Wainwright, 153 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1963).
28. See note 24 supra.
29. 153 So.2d 299, 300 (Fla. 1963). See also Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas
Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1948).
30. Gammage v. State, 154 So.2d 712 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
31. Reiff v. United States, 288 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1961).
32. June 12, 1963 No. 063-62.
33. Neering v. State, 141 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
34. Nations v. State, 145 So.2d 259 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). FIA. STAT. § 921.13 (1961)
provides:
Inquiry into mitigating or aggravating circumstances.. . . When the court has dis-
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An odd situation arose when the state attempted to incarcerate a
71-year-old defendant under a sentence which had remained unexecuted
for five years. The state admitted it had no explanation for the delay.
The appellate court 5 released the defendant without benefit of Florida
authority,8 because the long delay was not the fault of the defendant,
and society would not benefit from his imprisonment.
The Supreme Court of Florida construed 7 sections 944.27-28 of the
Florida Statutes to provide that gain time allowance must be approved
by the Board of Commissioners of the State Institutions. The court
then pointed out that this is a most inefficient mechanism because the
Board comprises all cabinet officers and the Governor, and suggested
remedial legislation. The legislature did amend the above statutes to
provide a schedule of gain time granted by the director rather than the
board. 8
III. ACCUSED AS A WITNESS
If a statement by the prosecution could be construed as an indirect
reference to the fact that the defendant did not testify, the defendant
is entitled to a new trial. This policy was applied in one case 9 in which
a witness testified to facts known only to himself and the defendant, and
the prosecution stated that the testimony of the witness was uncontra-
verted. The principle was extended to a new factual situation in Harper
v. State4" when the prosecution commented that a co-defendant, Rogers,
had not testified. The defendant (Harper) was granted a new trial. The
court cited two similar Florida cases 41 and stated,42 "Recognizing that
neither of the foregoing, by reason of distinguishing facts or the nature
of the pronouncement, constitute controlling precedent, we are nonethe-
less constrained to the view that the principles therein articulated, when
applied to the instant case, require a new trial." Shortly thereafter the
court cited and followed Harper in a similar case.43
cretion as to the penalty to be inflicted on the defendant it shall, upon the sugges-
tion of either party that there are circumstances which may properly be taken into
consideration, hear evidence as .to the same summarily in open court, either imme-
diately or at a specified time and upon such notice to the adverse party, as the court
may direct; or the court may inquire into such circumstances of its own motion.
35. State v. Buchanan, 149 So.2d 574 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
36. The following were cited to justify the release: Weber v. Mosley, 242 S.W.2d 273
(1951) ; Ex Parte Bugg, 145 S.W. 831 (1912); 24B C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1999 (1962).
37. Nicholas v. Wainwright, 152 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1963).
38. Fla. Laws 1963, ch.. 63-243; The Florida Correction Code of 1957 was adopted by
Chapter 57-121 Laws of 1957 and comprises FLA. STAT. ch. 944 (1961).
39. King v. State, 143 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1962). To the same effect: Tolliver v. State,
133 So.2d 565 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
40. 151 So.2d 881 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
41. King v. State, 143 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1962); Trafficante v. State, 92 So.2d 811 (FIa.
1957).
42. 151 So.2d 881, 883 (1963).
43. Clouser v. State, 152 So.2d 200 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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In Pinkley v. State"4 the court indicated that since a comment by
the prosecution is not reversible error if defense counsel had previously
called the jury's attention to the fact that the defendant had not testified,
it was not necessary to determine whether the statement made by the
prosecution amounted to a comment or not. In a later case45 raising the
same issue, the state attorney made several remarks in spite of warnings
by the trial judge. The third district granted a new trial, stating that a
remark by defense counsel does not open the door to any comment by
the prosecution. The court specifically disagreed with the views expressed
in the Pinkley case that it is not necessary to determine if the remarks
by the prosecutor amount to a comment or not when the defense counsel
previously had referred to the fact that the defendant had not testified.46
IV. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION
In Trafficante v. State,4 citing federal authority, the court held
that a count charging a conspiracy to commit two different crimes (bribery
and gambling) should not be quashed for duplicity even though the
penalties for the two crimes were different. The rationale was that only
one sentence could be imposed.
V. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The law concerning the property rights which a person must possess
in order to contest the validity of a warrant to search that property,
was the subject of much dispute and discussion in a recent case.4 The
defendant was not allowed to contest the validity of a warrant to search
an apartment. The apartment was leased to and occupied by his "girl
friend." The defendant paid part of the rent, had a key, and occasionally
slept there. The district court of appeal could not reach a clear majority
opinion. Judge Hendry decided that the defendant had sufficient property
interest to contest. His view was that Florida courts have treated the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States as authority in
search and seizure cases,49 and that continued compliance, though not
mandatory, is advisable. He then cited Jones v. United States,50 in which
on similar facts5 the defendant's property interest was held sufficient.
44. 142 So.2d 144 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
45. Griffin v. State, 150 So.2d 466 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
46. See Comment, Failure to Testify-Comment by Co-Defendant, 17 U. Mmai L. Rv.
435 (1963).
47. 136 So.2d 264 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961). The general principle that a single conspiracy
may have for its purpose the commission of two or more different offenses, has been ap-
plied previously, Brown v. State, 130 Fla. 479, 178 So. 153 (1938), but the issue was
former jeopardy.
48. Leveson v. State, 138 So.2d 361 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
49. Houston v. State, 113 So.2d 582 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959).
50. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
51. The defendant paid no rent and was allowed occupancy as a friend.
19631
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Justice Hendry stated: 52 "Viewing the question . . . in the light of the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Jones Case . . . the
1153trial court was in error ....
Judge Carroll"4 held that the defendant as a lessee-occupant should
have been allowed to contest the validity of the warrant on the basis of
existing Florida law. 5 He saw no reason for an expressed or implied
extension of Florida law to include "anyone legitimately on the prem-
ises.'" Judge Pearson57 thought that Florida should not adopt the Jones
decision and that under existing Florida law the defendant did not have
standing to contest.
On certiorari58 the Florida Supreme Court restored jurisdiction to
the district court with the request that a clear majority be adopted with
supporting theory. On reconsideration by the district court,5 9 the majority
opinion said that the defedant had standing to contest but stated "[W] e
have been unable to reconcile the ... views of the separate judges as to
some of the reasoning employed ... ."1o On the state's subsequent petition
for certiorari on the basis of a question of great public interest, the su-
preme court held that under existing Florida law the defendant's right of
custody and possession was sufficient for him to contest the validity of
the search warrant.6' The court specifically stated that it was not neces-
sary to determine the applicability of the rule of Jones v. United States.
The law pertaining to the search of vehicles was severely limited
in a well reasoned case. 2 After the defendant had wrecked his car, he
was taken to a hospital and the car was towed to a garage and impounded.
Subsequently police officers, without a warrant and not as an incident of
a valid arrest, searched the car and found lottery tickets. At the trial the
defendant made the appropriate objections to the admission of evidence
so obtained. The district court noted that the legality of the search de-
pended upon section 933.19 of the Florida Statutes, which adopted the
decision in Carroll v. United States" as the law of Florida. Florida
courts consider that the case holds that a search of a vehicle "will be
deemed reasonable if the searching officer, prior to making the search,
had probable cause to believe that the contents of the automobile offended
52. 138 So.2d 361, 364 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
53. The Jones decision contains the following language: "anyone legitimately on the
premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality . . . ." 358 U.S. 257, 267 (1960).
54. 138 So.2d 361, 366 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962) (concurring opinion).
55. Mixon v. State, 54 So.2d 190 (Fla. 1951).
56. See note 53 supra.
57. 138 So.2d 361, 367 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962) (dissenting opinion).
58. State v. Leveson, 147 So.2d 524 (Fla. 1962).
59. Leveson v. State, 149 So.2d 80 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
60. 149 So.2d 80, 81 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
61. State v. Leveson, 151 So.2d 283 (Fla. 1963).
62. Miller v. State, 137 So.2d 21 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
63. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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against the law .... ,,1 The district court stated that the trend of Florida
cases65 was to restrict the application of this rule, that further restriction
was to be expected, and ruled that the search was illegal for two reasons.
First, when (as in the instant case) "doubt exists as to whether the
officer was reasonable in concluding that a search was justified, such a
doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant whose property was
searched." 6 Second, the Carrol6 7 doctrine was designed to apply when
a vehicle could be employed as a means of escape or removing evidence.
Here the car was a wreck, not an operating vehicle, and thus the state
had time to procure a warrant without risk.
An interesting pair of cases involved searches following an invita-
tion to enter. In one instance the defendants, unaware that the two
strangers standing in the rain were police officers, invited them into the
building out of the weather. The officers observed general activity as-
sociated with lottery operation, identified themselves, arrested the de-
fendants and searched the building. The search was held lawful because
it was related to a lawful arrest for a felony being committed in the
officers' presence.68
In the other case the officers had followed the defendant to a city
beyond their jurisdiction and thus were acting only under the color of
their office. They knocked upon the door of his motel room and he al-
lowed them to enter, knowing that they were police officers. The district
court 9 held that when an officer gains access to private living quarters
under color of his office he must have some valid basis for the intrusion,
and here there was none. The policy of the court was stated in strong
language: "Any other rule . . . would obliterate one of the most funda-
mental distinctions between our form of government, where officers are
under the law, and the police-state where they are the law."
'70
VI. FAIR TRIAL
Since defendants have considerable difficulty obtaining information
from the state, the courts are frequently sympathetic to the argument
that withholding information may preclude a fair trial. For example,
when the state's witness (a detective) was allowed to refer to notes made
during interrogation, a refusal to make the notes available to the defense
64. Miller v. State, 137 So.2d 21, 22 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
65. Byrd v. State, 80 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1955) ; Collins v. State, 65 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1953);
Cameron v. State, 112 So.2d 864 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959); Alexander v. State, 107 So.2d 261
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1958).
66. 137 So.2d 21, 25 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
67. See note 54 supra.
68. Adams v. State, 143 So.2d 903 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). The fact that the officers had
a search warrant is immaterial because the warrant was invalid, the validity of the search
was not based upon the warrant, and the warrant was not used to gain entrance.
69. Collins v. State, 143 So.2d 700 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
70. Id. at 703.
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was a denial of the defendant's right to confront his accusers and to con-
duct a full and fair cross-examination. 7 On the other hand, in an incest
case, the defendant claimed that refusal to order a blood test was error.
The district court held that since a blood test did not bear directly upon
the issue, but rather would serve only to impeach a witness, and when
other witnesses had given testimony sufficient to sustain a conviction,
the refusal was not reversible error. 72 Baker v. State73 introduced an
important limitation upon the "right" of the state to refuse to identify
a "confidential informant." The court stated,
It is true that it has been held in this state that the prosecution
may not always be required to reveal the name of a confidential
informant, but this rule should not be applicable when the so-
called alleged "confidential informant" actually executes the
affidavit which is the initial instrument which set in motion
what ultimately results in a criminal proceeding.
74
In Morgan v. State75 the court decided, on basis of federal authority,
that the defendant is not entitled to access to the pre-sentence report of
the Florida Parole Commission because it is not a public document but
rather confidential in nature.
When a defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of
insanity, the trial judge committed reversible error by reading to the
jury a court order stating that the defendant was sane, able to stand trial
and aid his attorney. This amounted to an improper comment on the
weight, character, or effect of evidence relating to a material issue.78
A question which appears to be new in Florida arose in Goswick v.
State. The defendant claimed that the prosecution infringed upon his
right against self-incrimination by showing on cross-examination of a
witness for the state that the witness had invoked the fifth amendment
when he was subpoenaed before the state's attorney. The court, citing
federal authority,7' affirmed the conviction and indicated that the
question turned upon whether the jury would be likely to consider that
the witness's refusal to testify implied that the defendant was guilty.
71. Minturn v. State, 136 So.2d 359 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
72. Bowden v. State, 137 So.2d 621 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
73. 150 So.2d 729 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
74. 150 So.2d 729, 730 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
75. 142 So.2d 308 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). For a discussion of defendants' rights to dis-
covery see State v. Lampp, 155 So.2d 10 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). The court held that the
defendant's constitutional rights (equal protection, due process) did not entitle him to sub-
poenas ad testificandum, requiring persons to appear before the court reporter and disclose
to the defense counsel under oath any knowledge they had about the case so that a defense
might be prepared.
76. Gans v. State, 134 So.2d 257 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
77. 137 So.2d 863 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
78. United States v. Sing Kee, 250 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1957).
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VII. JURISDICTION
Questions have arisen concerning the practice of substituting one
justice of the peace for another who was not available. The Supreme
Court of Florida 79 resolved the problem by amending Rule 21 (a) (4) (i),
to provide that a justice of the peace who is unable to act, or his clerk,
may so advise the chief justice. The latter may assign any other justice
of the peace, or any other judge (except supreme court justices, district
court of appeal judges or circuit judges) of any other state court having
the same or greater jurisdiction, to perform the duty. The court pointed
out that section 37.228° of the Florida Statutes is no longer effective in
the absence of an order designating the substituted judge to act for the
disabled judge."'
VIII. CHARGE TO THE JURY
Section 918.10(4) of the Florida Statutes provides that the giving
or failure to give instructions to the jury cannot be assigned as error
unless appropriate objection was made. Related problems have been
solved in two ways. First, a new trial will be granted even though no
appropriate objection was made, if the judge caused "fundamental
error.'!8" The definition of fundamental error was discussed in Brown v.
State,83 in which the majority decided that an erroneous charge as to
murder in the third degree was not fundamental error when the evidence
did not put this degree of homicide in issue. The second solution, sug-
gested by Justice Drew in his dissenting opinion in the Brown case, is to
apply Rule 6.16(a) of the Florida Appellate Rules, which gives appellate
courts discretionary power, in the "interests of justice," to consider
errors in instructions whether they were objected to or not. This method
was adopted in Canada v. State8 4 to grant a new trial when the charge
on an essential element (intent necessary for larceny) was insufficient,
no appropriate objection was made, but the evidence put the issue in
doubt.
IX. CONFESSIONS
A line of federal decisions8 indicates that an unnecessary delay in
79. In re Florida Appellate Rules, 132 So.2d 159 (Fla. 1961).
80. "In case a justice of the peace be disqualified or unable from any cause to try any
criminal case, the same may be tried before any other justice of the peace of the county, or
before the county judge." FLA. STAT. § 37.22 (1961).
81. The case -which raised the problem was State v. Robinson, 132 So.2d 159 (Fla.
1961).
82. Leach v. State, 132 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1961); Hamilton v. State, 88 So.2d 606 (Fla.
1956).
83. 124 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1960); Wills, Criminal Law Survey, 16 U. MiArs L. REv. 225
(1961).
84. 139 So.2d 753 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
85. E.g., Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Upshaw v. United States, 335
U.S. 410 (1948); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). But see United States v.
Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1943) (Court held admissible a confession that was not the "fruit"
of the unlawful delay).
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presentation before a magistrate in itself constitutes a denial of due
process and renders a confession so obtained inadmissible. Sections
901.06 and 901.23 of the Florida Statutes provide that after arrest the
defendant should be taken before a magistrate without unnecessary
delay. Florida has not followed the federal rule, the practice of the
police is not always in compliance with the above statutes, and failure
to comply does not affect the validity of a subsequent trial. 86 The trend
toward federal practices evident in other phases of criminal procedure
has not made much of a change in this area. In Milton v. Cochran"7 the
defendant claimed his confession was coerced by several factors, one
being a 22-day delay between arrest and presentation before a magistrate.
The court stated it was not shown that the delay caused the confession,
and although it did not condone such action by the police, it expressly
reaffirmed the position that the federal rule does not apply. In another
case 8 in which the delay was about a week, the majority held the con-
fession to be admissible. Justice Drew expressed the view in dissent that
delay itself can amount to duress. The court rejected the federal rule in
still another case" in which the delay was about a month."0
X. WITHDRAWAL OF PLEA OF GUILTY
Section 909.13 of the Florida Statutes provides that a plea of not
guilty may be withdrawn at the discretion of the court at any time before
sentence. In Banks v. State9 the court held that to refuse to allow the
defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty after sentence was an abuse of
discretion when the defendant, on the basis of conversations with the
state attorney, honestly but mistakenly believed that he would be put
on probation. 2 On the other hand, when a defendant mistakenly believed
that the pre-sentence investigation would result in recommendation for
probation, withdrawal of his plea of guilty after sentence was denied.1
3
It was not an abuse of discretion to deny a defendant's motion to with-
draw his plea of guilty made before sentence, when the reason for the
86. DiBona v. State, 121 So.2d 192 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960). Note also that in Simmons v.
State, 132 So.2d 235 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961), it was not error to refuse to allow the defendant
to withdraw his plea of guilty on the basis that he had been denied a preliminary hearing.
87. 147 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1962).
88. Dawson v. State, 139 So.2d 408 (Fla. 1962).
89. Young v. State, 140 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1962).
90. See also Leach v. State, 132 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1961). In another case, Kraft v. State,
143 So.2d 863 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962), it was held that the confession was admissible because
the record did not show that the defendant was not taken before a magistrate.
For general background see Enwall, Effect of Delay Between Arrest Without Warrant
and Preliminary Hearing upon Admissibility of ad Interim Confessions, 2 U. FLA. L. REV.
330 (1949).
91. 136 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
92. Withdrawal of a plea of guilty after sentence has been allowed before. Ward v.
State, 156 Fla. 185, 22 So.2d 887 (1945).
93. Morgan v. State, 142 So.2d 308 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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motion was the failure to present the defendant to a committing magis-
trate.
94
An appalling case involved a collateral issue. An obviously emo-
tionally disturbed defendant without an attorney pleaded "guilty by
reason of insanity." The trial judge treated his plea as an unqualified
plea of guilty and he was convicted. The supreme court95 stated that the
trial judge should have taken steps under the appropriate statutes9" to
determine sanity and remanded the case for this purpose.
XI. IMMUNITY
There have been instances9 7 in the past in which the courts seemed
to consider that procedural expediency outweighed the defendant's rights
to immunity under section 932.29 of the Florida Statutes. In a recent
case, 8 the appellate court afforded the defendant ample protection. At
the trial the defendant refused to answer a question. The trial judge told
him that his answer would not incriminate him and that if he refused to
answer he would be in contempt. The defendant did refuse and was held
in contempt. The appellate court reversed because the trial judge did not
inform the defendant of his rights under the statute. 99
XII. BAIL
An important point concerning bail was resolved in Mathis v.
Starr.' An insolvent defendant indicted for a capital crime had been
denied bond by the circuit court because "it is necessary that the peti-
tioner show that he can make bail in a reasonable amount before the
court will determine whether or not he is entitled to bail."10' The Su-
preme Court of Florida decided that denial of bail in a capital case where
the proof is not evident nor the presumption great is a denial of due proc-
ess and that the solvency of the defendant is not a condition precedent
to the circuit court's primary duty of making such a determination.
94. Simmons v. State, 132 So.2d 235 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
95. Hobbs v. Cochran, 143 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1962).
96. FLA. STAT. ch. 917 (1961).
97. Poppell v. State, 148 Fla. 275, 4 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1941).
98. Ballangee v. State, 144 So.2d 68 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
99. FLA. STAT. § 932.24 (1961).
100. 152 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1963). In another case, Lambert v. State, 151 So.2d 675
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1963), the law concerning the power of the court to set and modify bail
was discussed and applied to a novel factual situation. The defendant posted bond pending
his appeal. Subsequently he was arrested on another charge and the trial judge doubled his
bond. The defendant claimed that the bond was increased without further hearing. The trial
judge's order included the clause, "This cause coming on to be heard upon the court's own
motion . . . ." Since the court is presumed to follow correct procedure, and since the record
failed to show an abuse of discretion, the motion to reduce bail was denied.
101. 152 So.2d 161, 162 (Fla. 1963).
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XIII. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Section 932.05 of the Florida Statutes provides that non-capital
offenses must be prosecuted within two years after commission. No dif-
ficulty arises when an indictment or information was filed within two
years even though the trial was considerably delayed, and probably some
attorneys assumed that the filing of a charge was the first act by the
state which would toll the statute. In State v. Emanuel02 the court held
that the prosecution was commenced and the statute tolled when a valid
arrest warrant was placed in the hands of the proper official for service.
XIV. HABITUAL OFFENDERS
An important limitation of the application of the habitual offenders
statute'0 3 was illustrated in Reynolds v. Cochran. °4 The defendant was
arrested and subsequently sentenced under the statute two months after
he had completed all sentences for previous convictions. The supreme
court held that completed sentences could not be extended by resentenc-
ing, and that a habitual offender may not be subject to enhanced punish-
ment by the statute once he has fully satisfied the judgment pursuant to
his conviction for his last offense. The court noted that the statute pro-
vided, "If at any time after sentence or conviction it shall appear that
a person convicted of a felony has previously been convicted of crimes...
the court in which such conviction was had shall cause said person
whether confined in prison or otherwise, to be brought before it,' 05 and
that this language had been applied literally in some cases.'06 Never-
theless, the court preferred to so limit the statute and thus avoid issues
of due process, equal protection and cruel and unusual punishment.
XV. NOLO CONTENDERE
The case of Peel v. State07 concerned matters of first impression in
Florida. The court held that when the defendant voluntarily pleaded
nolo contendere on condition that he would be given a life sentence, he
may not complain of the trial court's acceptance of his plea. It further
was held that the plea has the same effect as a plea of guilty, in that the
defendant may not raise questions on appeal concerning matters other
than the sufficiency of the accusatory writ.
XVI. FORMER JEOPARDY
The usual rule that former jeopardy may not be used as a defense
when the former proceedings were void was applied to an unusual situa-
102. 153 So.2d 839 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
103. FLA. STAT. §§ 775.09-.11 (1961).
104. 138 So.2d 500 (Fla. 1962).
105. FLA. STAT. § 775.11 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
106. State v. Nelson, 160 Fla. 744, 36 So.2d 427 (1948).
107. 105 So.2d 281 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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tion in which a minor's former conviction for the offense was void be-
cause the "notice to parents statute"' 018 was not satisfied.'0 9
XVII. LOTTERY
The defendant was charged with a violation of section 849.09 of
the Florida Statutes, by an information which stated that he previously
had been convicted of violating the same statute, which provides heavier
penalties for successive convictions. The defendant moved to quash, al-
leging that the reference to a previous conviction deprived him of due
process and his presumption of innocence, and placed his character into
evidence without his permission. The court"0 noted that when a de-
fendant is tried for a particular crime, he would be denied a fair trial if
the indictment or information alleged that he had been convicted pre-
viously of an unrelated crime for the purpose of enhanced punishment
under the habitual offender statute."' However, it noted that the two
statutes are quite different. The habitual offender statute"' refers to
habitual felonious criminality generally, while the lottery statute in-
volves identical or related offenses. The former statute provides for dis-
tinct proceedings to determine whether the defendant had successive
convictions and thus the fact of prior convictions need not be deter-
mined at the trial for a subsequent violation. The latter statute has no
such provision. Florida statutes involving forgery, 18 counterfeiting,,"
narcotics,".. and beverage laws"' are similar to the lottery statute in
that the increased penalty for successive convictions is provided in the
body of the statute. The Supreme Court of Florida has held, under the
beverage statute, that an allegation of the former conviction is not only
permitted, but required." 7 Therefore the court held that the information
charging a previous conviction for lottery was not defective.
XVIII. WORTHLESS CHECK
The previous survey"" noted that the phrase "things of value" con-
tained in the worthless check statute" 9 created problems of interpreta-
tion. The third district 20 reversed a conviction for issuing a worthless
108. FLA. STAT. § 932.38 (1961).
109. Michell v. State, 154 So.2d 701 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
110. State v. Curtis, 152 So.2d 754 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
ill. Shargaa v. State, 102 So.2d 814 (Fla. 1958).
112. See note 103 supra.
113. FLA. STAT. § 831.10 (1961).
114. FLA. STAT. § 831.17 (1961).
115. FLA. STAT. § 398.22 (1961).
116. FLA. STAT. § 562.45 (1961).
117. Barnhill v. State, 41 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1949); Smith v. State, 75 Fla. 468, 78 So.
530 (1918).
118. Wills, Criminal Law Survey, 16 U. MiAm L. Rav. 225 (1961).
119. FLA. STAT. § 832.05(3) (1961).
120. Harris v. State, 123 So.2d 752 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
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check to obtain things of value in excess of $100.00 because the check
was issued to pay a pre-existing debt-not a "thing of value." On cer-
tiorari the supreme court 12' stated that the defendant could have been
convicted under the lesser included offense of issuing a worthless check
without obtaining something of value.
22
XIX. SECURITIES
In Hammond v. State, 2 a case of first impression, the court con-
strued section 517.05, of the Uniform Sale of Securities Law, so that
the transaction may be exempt from registration even though the se-
curities are not.
XX. HOMICIDE
The question of manslaughter by culpable negligence in failure to
aid or be concerned with the safety of another arose during the period
surveyed but Florida law remains uncertain. The defendant was con-
victed for failing to aid his wife during a four-hour period when she
needed medical attention. The First District' 24 reversed, but avoided
the issue by deciding that the conduct of the defendant was not the cause
of death.'25
XXI. CONCEALED WEAPONS
The language "care, custody, possession or control" of a relatively
new statute 28 concerning concealed weapons was held 27 not to require
physical handling. 2
XXII. EXTORTION
Generally it is immaterial whether an extortion threat is directed
against the person to whom the threat is communicated or against an-
other person. This principle was applied to sustain a conviction under
the Florida statute12 when the threat was to expose alleged tax evasion
activities of a corporation in which the person was interested.3 0
121. State v. Harris, 136 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1962).
122. FLA. STAT. § 832.05(2) (1961). The meaning of the phrases "things of value" and
"pre-existing debt" is not resolved. Consider the problem posed in the previous survey-a
person charges articles in excess of one hundred dollars value and the following day sends
the store a worthless check.
123. 151 So.2d 872 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
124. Nevals v. State, 145 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
125. Failure of a father to furnish medical aid to a badly burned child for three weeks
was held not to be manslaughter by culpable negligence. Bradley v. State, 79 Fla. 651, 84
So. 677 (1920).
126. FLA. STAT. § 790.23 (1961).
127. Maloney v. State, 146 So.2d 581 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
128. The court cited Reynolds v. State, 92 Fla. 1038, 1'11 So. 285 (1926) (concerning
liquor); People v. Furey, 13 App. Div. 2d 412, 217 N.Y.S.2d 189 (1961); People v. Russo,
278 App. Div. 98, 103 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1951).
129. FLA. STAT. § 836.05 (1961).




Defendants have difficulty obtaining information from the state.
The legislature increased defendant's rights in this regard by providing'
that after an indictment or information is filed, the court upon motion
shall order the prosecuting attorney to permit the defendant to inspect
and copy or photograph written or recorded statements or confessions
whether signed or unsigned. Judicial discretion is not mentioned nor
implied.
Charpter 921 of the Florida Statutes, dealing with sentencing, was
amended by a provision"'. that there shall be no "authority to cause a
sentence to imprisonment to begin running at any time prior to the date
that it is imposed.""' 2 The act permits credit on the sentence for time
spent in jail before the sentence was imposed. The indeterminate sentence
statute,"' which provided that the maximum sentence could be less than
the maximum authorized by law for the non-capital felony involved, has
been amended1 4 so that the maximum sentence may be less than the
maximum authorized by law but not less than the authorized minimum,
if any.
A new act" 5 which may affect the number of times the question of
sanity will be raised provides that persons committed to a state hospital
by order of a criminal court shall be liable for payment for care and
maintenance. The provision does not apply to persons committed while
serving a criminal sentence.
The legislature provided for a group to be known as the "special
commission for the study of the abolition of the death penalty in capital
cases." The duty of the commission is "to make an investigation and
study relative to the abolition of the death penalty in capital cases," and
report to the next session.16 In the opinion of the writer the creation of
such a commission is a progressive and laudable step. The language used
seems to imply that the problem is not the advisability of abolishing the
death penalty but the means.
Other legislation of interest was incorporated in the text of the
survey."7
131. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-263.
132. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-457, to be codified as FLA. STAT. § 921.161 (1963).
133. FLA. STAT. § 921.18 (1961).
134. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-306.
135. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-551, amending FLA. STAT. § 394.22 by adding a sub-
section (20).
136. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-362.
137. See note 21 supra (public defenders office), and note 37 supra (sentence).
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